Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
国家中医药管理局


国家中医药管理局印发《关于进一步加强中西医结合工作的指导意见》的通知

各省、自治区、直辖市卫生厅局、中医药管理局，局各直属单位：

　　为进一步加强中西医结合工作，促进中西医结合事业的发展，在认真调查研究和广泛听取意见的基础上，我局研究制定了《关于进一步加强中西医结合工作的指导意见》，现印发给你们，请结合实际，认真贯彻执行。



　　　　　　　　　　二○○三年十一月五日



国家中医药管理局关于进一步加强中西医结合工作的指导意见

　　中西医结合是在我国既有中医又有西医的历史条件下产生的，是中国特色社会主义卫生事业的重要组成部分，在我国人民的医疗卫生保健中发挥着重要作用。中西医结合充分吸收两种医学特长，并使之相互沟通、相互融合、相互促进、相互补充，对继承发展中医药学，实现中医药现代化，促进我国医学和世界医学的进步具有重要意义。

　　新中国成立以来，党和政府非常重视中西医结合工作，制定了一系列方针政策，促进我国中西医结合事业的发展。1997年，《中共中央、国务院关于卫生改革与发展的决定》明确提出，"中西医要加强团结，互相学习，取长补短，共同提高，促进中西医结合"。2003年10月1日实施的《中华人民共和国中医药条例》进一步规定，"推动中医、西医两种医学体系的有机结合，全面发展我国中医药事业"。到目前，我国中西医结合机构建设取得长足进展，中西医结合人才培养体系正在形成，中西医结合学术研究水平不断提高，出现了一批在国内外具有广泛影响的研究成果，中西医结合学术活动日益活跃，国际交流与合作更加广泛。但是，我们也应看到，中西医结合工作还存在不少困难和问题，主要表现在，对发展中西医结合事业的认识还需进一步提高，中西医结合优势和特色发挥的还不够充分，人才培养体系还不够健全，理论、临床及方法学研究尚需进一步深入。

　　为进一步加强中西医结合工作，解决存在的困难和问题，特提出以下意见。

　　一、中西医结合工作的指导思想和主要任务

　　（一）中西医结合工作的指导思想是：认真贯彻党的中西医结合方针政策，积极利用现代科学技术，充分吸收中医、西医两种医学特长，发掘、整理、研究、阐释中医药学的经验真知和理论精华，以提高临床疗效和学术水平为核心，以基地建设为基础，以人才培养为重点，以研究中西医结合点为主线，积极探索，开拓创新，促进中西医结合不断发展，更好地为人类健康服务。

　　（二）当前及今后一个时期中西医结合工作的主要任务是：积极吸收和利用中医药及现代医学的理论、技术和方法，通过多学科的交叉、渗透与融合，深入探索中西医的结合点；广泛开展中西医结合临床研究，特别是针对目前严重危害人类健康的重大疾病和疑难疾病，提出中西医结合防治的新理论、新方案和新方法；加强中西医结合基础研究，揭示中西医结合防病治病原理，促进中西医结合学术创新；培养和造就一支适应社会和学科发展需要高素质的中西医结合人才队伍；建设一批特色突出、优势显著、设施配套、功能齐全、管理科学的中西医结合医疗、科研基地；完善中西医结合技术标准规范，整体提高中西医结合学术水平和防病治病能力。

　　二、加强中西医结合医疗基地建设，形成自身特色和优势

　　（三）进一步优化中西医结合医疗资源配置。各地在制定区域卫生规划和调整卫生资源过程中，应进一步明确中西医结合医疗机构的功能定位。省级中西医结合医院应当成为区域性医疗中心之一，尚未建立省级中西医结合医院的地方，要积极创造条件建立（或改建）一所省级中西医结合医院。加强综合医院中西医结合科、中西医结合专科医院建设。鼓励和支持符合条件的综合医院或专科医院向中西医结合医院方向发展。鼓励和支持中西医结合医疗机构间，以及与其他医疗机构间的合作、联合，实现优势互补、资源共享，发挥规模效益。

　　中西医结合医疗机构、科室要以系统掌握中医、西医两种医学知识与技能的中西医结合人员为主体，设置及装备条件要逐步达到国家规定的要求。有条件的中西医结合医院应设立研究机构，加强临床研究。国家中医药管理局确定的全国重点中西医结合医院建设单位，要认真做好建设工作，完成建设任务，充分发挥示范带动作用，推动中西医结合医院整体水平的提高。

　　（四）进一步加强中西医结合医疗机构、科室内涵建设，逐步形成自身特色与优势。中西医结合医疗机构、科室要全面开展中西医结合诊疗工作。综合性中西医结合医院要在完善综合服务功能的同时，逐步形成若干中西医结合优势学科或技术中心；专科性中西医结合医院、科室要突出重点，逐步形成特色与优势。要强化中西医结合单病种的质量管理，巩固已取得的成果，积极做好成果推广工作。

　　重视和加强中西医结合专科建设。重点加强已有的27个国家中医药管理局"十五"重点中西医结合专科项目建设，巩固各级中西医结合专科项目建设成果，在全国逐步形成专业覆盖面广、地区分布合理、专科优势互补、运行机制良好、规模效益明显的中西医结合优势专科基地，发挥其在技术指导、人员培训和成果推广等方面作用，使其成为全国中西医结合医疗及临床科研技术中心。

　　（五）进一步深化改革，强化中西医结合医疗机构管理。中西医结合医疗机构要积极探索建立适应新形势要求的管理体制和内部运行机制，深入开展人事分配制度、后勤服务社会化等方面改革。进一步强化科学管理，加强对医务人员的培训，积极利用现代科学管理手段，不断提高科学管理水平。要以病人为中心，进一步规范服务行为，加强行业作风建设，确保医疗安全，控制医疗费用，提高工作绩效，不断提高医疗质量和服务水平。

　　政府举办的中西医结合医院特别是二级以上中西医结合医院，要在农村、社区卫生服务中充分发挥人员培训、技术指导和双向转诊的作用，以满足不同层次的医疗保健需求。

　　（六）充分发挥中西医结合在防治突发公共卫生事件中的作用。中西医结合是防治突发公共卫生事件的重要力量，具有特色和优势。有条件的地区争取在突发公共卫生事件医疗救治体系建设中，开展中西医结合传染病医院建设，使其成为中西医结合防治传染病等突发公共卫生事件的临床基地、研究基地及人员培训基地；鼓励在地级以上传染病医院设立中西医结合科和中西医结合病房，保证传染病患者能直接得到中西医结合治疗；中西医结合医院急诊科室应积极开展中西医结合防治传染病等突发公共卫生事件的研究，加强应对突发公共卫生事件的条件建设，不断提高运用中西医结合方法防治突发公共卫生事件的应急救治能力。

　　三、加强人才培养，建设高素质中西医结合队伍

　　（七）充分利用现有中医药和卫生教育资源，加强中西医结合继续教育。各地应采取多种形式，有计划、有组织地开展西医学习中医的系统培训工作。要充分利用中医和中西医结合医疗机构、高等医学院校，举办不同层次的西医学习中医培训班、研究班，鼓励西医人员离职学习中医，使各级中西医结合医疗机构中的中西医结合医生比例达到国家规定的标准。国家级重点学科、重点专科是中西医结合专科人才培训中心，应承担高层次中西医结合人才的培养培训任务；各省级中西医结合重点学科、专科要积极创造条件，承担起本地区中西医结合骨干人才的培训工作。

　　积极举办国家级中西医结合继续教育项目。不断完善中西医结合执业医师考试、专业技术职务任职资格考试的内容、标准，鼓励和吸引更多有志于中西医结合事业的人员充实到中西医结合队伍中去。

　　在中西医结合人才队伍建设中，要培养中西医结合人员坚持实践第一的精神，开拓进取，勇于创新，积极探索中西医结合的最佳途径。中西医结合人员应加强与中医及其他专业技术人员的团结合作，互相尊重，互相学习，促进多学科的相互融合，不断提高中西医结合的学术水平和创新能力。

　　（八）加强与国家有关部门的协调，促进和完善中西医结合学历教育，扩大高层次中西医结合人才培养规模。积极配合国家有关部门，继续办好7年制中医学专业中西医结合方向，争取开办长学制中西医结合专业教育，适当增加中西医结合博士研究生和硕士研究生学位授权点的数量，根据需要力争在3年内使中西医结合研究生的招生数量有较大增加。鼓励有条件的高等医学院校和中医、中西医结合医院联合举办中西医结合研究生班。

　　积极配合国家有关部门做好中西医结合教材编写和师资队伍建设工作，根据不同层次中西医结合人才的培养要求和培训目标，组织高水平的中西医结合专家编写好教学大纲、教材和教学用书。有计划地开展中西医结合师资培训工作，不断提高师资队伍素质。

　　（九）进一步加强中西医结合学科带头人和学科骨干的培养。要充分发挥老一辈中西医结合专家的"传、帮、带"作用，促进年轻一代学科带头人脱颖而出。鼓励老中西医结合专家通过师承形式培养学术继承人，加速中西医结合临床人才的成长。到"十五"期末，国家有计划地培养中西医结合学科带头人25名、技术骨干200名和高级管理人才100名。

　　（十）各地要培养和造就一支应对突发公共卫生事件的中西医结合医疗救治专业技术队伍，有计划地选拔一批具有较好中医理论和临床基础的中西医结合专业技术人员，开展中西医结合防治突发公共卫生事件的知识培训，提高中西医结合专业技术人员在突发公共卫生事件中的应急反应能力和救治水平，更好地发挥中西医结合应对突发公共卫生事件的重要作用。

　　四、加快中西医结合科技进步，促进中西医结合学术创新

　　（十一）积极利用现代科学的理论、技术和方法，继承发展祖国传统医学的特色和优势，以临床研究为重点，以提高中西医结合学术水平为核心，基础研究与临床研究相结合，通过多学科的交叉、渗透与融合，深入探索中西医的结合点，揭示中西医结合防病治病原理，进一步完善中西医结合的研究思路、方法，促进中西医结合学术创新。

　　（十二）中西医结合临床研究的重点是提高防病治病能力。要在总结中西医结合优势病种诊疗经验的基础上，进一步规范诊断标准，优化治疗方案，完善疗效评价体系，使局部的诊疗优势成为整体优势；要选准优势病种，探索新方法、新技术、新方案和新药物，不断有所突破。要加强中西医结合防治传染病等突发公共卫生事件的研究。以27个国家重点中西医结合专科为基础，有计划开展单病种中西医结合临床诊疗研究，探索中西医结合最佳诊疗方案。要进行中西医结合临床诊疗规律的系统研究，逐步形成中西医结合临床医学的理论框架和诊疗体系。

　　中西医结合基础研究要面向临床，重点是揭示中西医结合防治疾病的作用规律和疗效机理，为疾病的防治提供新的思路与方法。要深入开展中医"证"与"治则治法"的现代研究、中药方剂配伍规律及方药效用物质基础的研究以及中医诊断客观化的现代研究等，推动中西医结合在理论上的创新与突破。

　　（十三）深化中西医结合科技体制改革，加强中西医结合科研机构建设。保持科研队伍的相对稳定，抓好重点研究室的规划和建设，为研究工作提供必要的组织保障与物质保障。鼓励中西医结合研究机构、医疗机构与大专院校、科研单位、生产单位的技术合作，增强科技发展的活力与后劲。

　　（十四）加强中西医结合科学研究的管理。科研项目的管理要实行课题制，重大攻关项目要突出首席专家的作用。对已经完成的科研项目，要及时总结，进行技术推广。有条件的研究机构应成立中西医结合科研工作的设计、评价中心，以承担区域性技术咨询与评估工作。鼓励按照GCP的标准，开展大样本、多中心、高标准的临床科研协作攻关。

　　各地应积极推广技术成熟的中西医结合诊疗方法，认真总结老一辈中西医结合专家的学术思想和典型经验，同时，注意跟踪国际上医学和生命科学发展的新动态，引进先进的技术和设备，为中西医结合研究工作提供新的借鉴。

　　五、加强中西医结合标准化、规范化、信息化建设，扩大对外交流与合作

　　（十五）加强中西医结合规范化、标准化建设。在总结中西医结合优势病种经验的基础上，参考国际上的做法，加强组织协调，建立和完善具有中西医结合特点的诊断标准、治疗方案和疗效评价体系。进一步完善中西医结合医疗机构建设标准。研究各层次中西医结合人才培养目标，促进中西医结合人才培养质量的不断提高。

　　（十六）推进中西医结合信息化进程。加快信息技术在中西医结合领域的广泛应用，鼓励中西医结合信息技术、设备的研制与开发，加强中西医结合基础数据库建设，构建中西医结合信息网络，为中西医结合医疗、教学、科研、产业开发、对外交流提供信息支持。

　　（十七）多层次、多渠道开展中西医结合对外交流与合作。各级中医药行政管理部门要重视建立国家和地区间的学术交流与技术合作的正常渠道，鼓励各中西医结合医疗、研究机构与国外学术机构建立比较固定的合作关系，加强中西医结合人员交流，促进设立中西医结合对外科技合作项目。通过举办各种类型的国际学术会议，交流科研成果，扩大中西医结合在世界范围的影响。

　　六、加强组织领导，促进中西医结合事业健康发展

　　（十八）各级中医药行政管理部门要进一步提高认识，统一思想，把中西医结合作为本部门重要工作职责，加强对中西医结合工作的领导，安排具体人员负责此项工作。应按照本指导意见提出的要求，结合本地实际情况，在制定和实施中医药工作方案时，充实完善中西医结合工作内容，并制定具体的工作规划。要加强监督检查，保证中西医结合各项工作的落实。

　　（十九）加强中西医结合政策研究，为中西医结合发展创造良好的政策环境。各地应根据本地区实际情况，积极争取有利于中西医结合发展的相关政策，对西医人员离职、在职学习中医，在职称晋升、待遇等方面应有相应的政策保障。进一步加强对各级各类医疗、科研机构中的中西医结合工作的业务指导。充分发挥中西医结合学术团体在引导学术发展、促进学术交流、规范行业行为等方面的积极作用。

　　（二十）加强对中西医结合的投入，为中西医结合发展创造必要的物质条件。各地在争取政府增加投入的同时，积极拓宽筹资渠道，广泛动员和筹集社会各方面的资金，发展中西医结合事业。鼓励企事业单位、社会团体和个人自愿捐资，支持中西医结合事业发展。各级中西医结合机构要本着勤俭办事业的原则，健全规章制度，加强经济管理，不断提高效益。